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 Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.  My name 
is Lisa Heinzerling.  I am a Professor of Law at the Georgetown University 
Law Center.  I have also been a visiting professor at the Harvard and Yale 
Law Schools.  I am a graduate of the University of Chicago Law School, 
where I served as editor-in-chief of the University of Chicago Law Review.  
After law school I clerked for Judge Richard Posner on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and then for Justice William Brennan of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  I was an Assistant Attorney General in the 
Environmental Protection Division of the Massachusetts Attorney General’s 
Office for three years before coming to Georgetown in 1993.  My expertise 
is in environmental and administrative law.  I am also a Member Scholar of 
the Center for Progressive Regulation. 
 
The Center for Progressive Regulation is a nonprofit research and 
educational organization of university-affiliated academics with expertise in 
the legal, economic, and scientific issues related to regulation of health, 
safety, and the environment. CPR supports regulatory action to                          
protect health, safety, and the environment, and rejects the conservative view 
that government’s only function is to increase the economic efficiency of 
private markets. Through research and commentary, CPR seeks to inform 
policy debates, critique anti-regulatory research, enhance public 





My testimony today concerns U.S. legislation designed to implement 
international conventions on persistent organic pollutants (“POPs”).  I will 
make three basic points in this testimony: 
 
1.  As currently interpreted, the Toxic Substances Control Act is not 
an adequate mechanism for regulating toxic substances.  Thus the 
implementation of international agreements on POPs is of critical 
importance in ensuring the adequacy of future controls on toxic 
substances. 
 
2.  The paralyzing procedures contemplated by the “Gillmor 
Discussion Draft” [hereinafter “Discussion Draft”] circulating in the 
House would virtually guarantee that no new toxic substances would 
be added to the list of substances regulated by international 
agreements on POPs. 
 
3.  Recent assertions by the Executive Branch concerning supposed 
constitutional limits on using international decisions to trigger 
domestic obligations, and on requiring public notice-and-comment 
procedures based on such international decisions, are without merit. 
 
I. The Inadequacy of the Toxic Substances Control Act in Regulating 
Toxic Substances 
 
 The Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et 
seq., appears to hold great promise in controlling toxic substances. However, 
in reality, TSCA has delivered very little in the way of such control.  As 
explained below, one problematic but influential appeals court decision 
significantly narrowed the scope of TSCA’s most ambitious program for 
regulating toxic substances. 
 
 Section 6 of TSCA provides the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) with broad authority to control the manufacture, processing, 
distribution in commerce, use, and disposal of chemical substances and 
mixtures.  Section 6(a) gives the agency a wide-ranging menu of options for 
controlling harmful chemicals, including everything from requiring labeling 
for such chemicals to banning them altogether.  Section 6(a) of TSCA 
requires EPA – through the use of the mandatory “shall” – to regulate a 
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chemical substance when the agency finds there is a “reasonable basis” to 
conclude that it poses an “unreasonable risk of injury” to human health or 
the environment.  15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).  This provision requires the agency 
to regulate such a substance “to the extent necessary to protect adequately 
against such risk using the least burdensome requirements.” Id.  Section 
6(c)(1) instructs the agency, when issuing a rule under section 6(a), to 
“consider and publish a statement with respect to” the effects of a chemical 
on human health and the environment, the magnitude of exposures to such 
chemical, the benefits of the chemical for “various uses and the availability 
of substitutes for such uses,” and “the reasonably ascertainable economic 
consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national 
economy, small business, technological innovation, the environment, and 
public health.”  15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1). 
 
 TSCA’s section 6 is unique among the federal environmental laws in 
the extent to which it allows EPA to regulate harmful substances across 
exposure contexts (e.g., workplace and environmental) and across whole 
industries, thus giving the agency the opportunity to control essentially all of 
the important risks from a harmful chemical at once.  As noted, moreover, 
the statute also provides the agency with a virtual smorgasbord of regulatory 
options for controlling harmful chemicals.  As enacted, therefore, TSCA’s 
section 6 offered a good deal of promise in the ongoing effort to reduce the 
harmful effects of chemicals in our society.  Ultimately, however, the law’s 
rather vague injunction to protect against “unreasonable risks,” and its 
directive to EPA to undertake a cost-benefit balancing under section 6, 
contributed to a judicial decision which all but doomed the law to oblivion. 
 
 The first and only judicial interpretation of EPA’s authority to ban a 
substance under section 6(a) so limited EPA’s authority under this provision 
that section 6 has not played a significant role in limiting toxic chemicals in 
this country.  The interpretation came in the context of a challenge to EPA’s 
ban on virtually all manufacturing, processing, distribution in commerce, 
and use of asbestos, the agency’s first and only such ban under TSCA. 
 
 In 1979, EPA began looking into the possibility of banning asbestos 
under section 6 of TSCA.1  The agency acted in response to increasing 
concerns about the harms to human health caused by asbestos.  Ten years 
                                                 
1 Commercial and Industrial Use of Asbestos Fibers, 44 Fed. Reg. 60,061. 
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and a 45,000-page record later,2 EPA produced a final rule banning virtually 
all uses of asbestos in several phases.3  The agency found that asbestos 
posed an unreasonable risk to human health in all stages of its production 
and use, and that the substance was thus an appropriate candidate for the 
kind of comprehensive regulation offered by TSCA’s section 6.4
 
 The inevitable legal challenge ensued, and in 1991, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down EPA’s ban on asbestos in what 
remains the only judicial treatment of the basic parameters of section 6(a) of 
TSCA.  The court’s decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 
1201 (5th Cir. 1991), included, among others, the following holdings: 
 
1.  In order to regulate under section 6(a) of TSCA, EPA must begin 
by examining the least intrusive regulatory alternative (such as 
labeling), considering the costs and benefits of such alternative.  EPA 
may consider a more intrusive regulatory option only if “unreasonable 
risks” are predicted to remain under the less onerous alternative.  In 
order to justify a ban – like the asbestos ban – EPA would have to 
examine the costs and benefits of numerous less onerous regulatory 
alternatives, and conclude that each would allow unreasonable risks to 
remain unaddressed.   
 
2.  In examining costs and benefits under section 6(c) of TSCA, EPA 
was required to “discount” benefits as well as costs – which, in effect, 
means treating regulatory benefits such as lives saved as if they were a 
financial investment. Discounting benefits in the context of toxic 
chemical control places a large thumb on the scale – against 
regulation. 
 
3. EPA may not use unquantified benefits to justify regulating a 
harmful chemical, except in close cases. 
 
4.  EPA may not exceed undefined limits on how much money it 
requires industry to spend to save a human life. 
 
                                                 
2 PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY at 409 
(Aspen, 4th ed. 2003). 
3 EPA, Asbestos: Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce 
Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460 (1989). 
4 Id. at 29,461. 
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I examine each of these elements of the court’s decision, and its paralyzing 
effect on EPA’s power to regulate persistent organic pollutants under 
TSCA’s section 6, in turn. 
 
 Detailed Analysis of Less Burdensome Alternatives 
 
 In deciding to ban virtually all uses of asbestos, EPA had concluded 
that less onerous regulation would not eliminate the unreasonable risks of 
asbestos.  The agency considered several regulatory alternatives short of a 
ban, but concluded that these options would not adequately reduce the 
relevant risks.  The agency did not conduct a separate analysis of costs and 
benefits for each of the less restrictive alternatives it considered. 
 
 The court of appeals hearing the challenge to EPA’s rule held that 
EPA should have considered each regulatory alternative in detail, beginning 
with the least burdensome one and continuing on to more burdensome 
alternatives only if, at any given stage, the alternative under consideration 
did not reduce risks to a reasonable level.  At each stage, moreover, the 
agency was required to assess the costs and benefits of the option under 
consideration.  As the court put it: 
 
Upon an initial showing of product danger, the proper course for the 
EPA to follow is to consider each regulatory option, beginning with 
the least burdensome, and the costs and benefits of regulation under 
each option. The EPA cannot simply skip several rungs, as it did in 
this case, for in doing so, it may skip a less-burdensome alternative 
mandated by TSCA. Here, although the EPA mentions the problems 
posed by intermediate levels of regulation, it takes no steps to 
calculate the costs and benefits of these intermediate levels. Without 
doing this it is impossible, both for the EPA and for this court on 
review, to know that none of these alternatives was less burdensome 
than the ban in fact chosen by the agency. 
 
947 F.2d at 1217 (citation omitted).  The court justified the imposition of 
this heavy procedural burden on the agency by reference to the language of 
TSCA, which, the court concluded, offered regulatory options in an order 
proceeding from most to least stringent.  Id. at 1215-16.  In fact, however, 
the regulatory options identified in TSCA § 6 are not arranged in the tidy 
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order the court perceived.5  Moreover, even if they were, nothing in TSCA 
suggests that EPA is bound to follow the rigid and onerous procedure 
required by the court in Corrosion Proof Fittings.  Indeed, where, as EPA 
did with respect to asbestos, the agency finds that a substance poses 
unreasonable risks throughout its industrial life cycle, then the agency is 
bound by the terms of the statute to protect against “such risk.”  15 U.S.C. 
§2605(a).  In those circumstances, a product ban happens to be the “least 
burdensome” method available to protect against “such risk.” 
 
 Nevertheless, unless the decision is overturned by either the courts or 
Congress, Corrosion Proof Fittings remains the definitive statement of what 
is required to ban a substance under TSCA.  And what is required is 
unreasonably and unrealistically onerous.  In banning asbestos, as I have 
mentioned, EPA spent ten years and produced a 45,000-page record.  Yet it 
compiled detailed cost and benefit information only on the alternative of 
banning asbestos.  Imagine the time, resources, and analysis required under 
the court of appeals’ approach, which requires EPA to conduct a detailed 
cost-benefit analysis of every regulatory option available under TSCA 
section 6. 
 
 Such a process is not merely onerous; it may well be impossible.  In 
analyzing the costs and benefits of a ban of asbestos, EPA was faced with 
the difficult but not impossible task of trying to identify the risks that would 
be avoided if asbestos were no longer used or produced (with very limited 
exceptions).  Even so, the task was complicated and time-consuming, and 
many of the benefits of EPA’s ban – including the prevention of nonfatal 
illnesses associated with asbestos, and the prevention of death from any 
disease other than cancer – remained unquantified by the agency.  Under the 
court of appeals’ approach, however, EPA would be forced to figure out 
how many lives would be saved by, for example, a particular labeling 
requirement; how many saved by a particular disposal requirement; and so 
forth.  The analytical demands imposed by the court of appeals’ decision are 
positively paralyzing. 
 
 Discounting Benefits 
 
                                                 
5 For a critique of the court of appeals’ decision on this ground and others, see Thomas O. 
McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor 
Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525, 541-49 (1997). 
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 In evaluating the costs and benefits of banning asbestos, EPA did not 
engage in formal cost-benefit analysis, which would have involved 
translating regulatory benefits – such as human lives saved – into monetary 
terms.  Instead, EPA estimated the economic costs and life-saving benefits 
of the rule, and compared the costs and benefits without use of the common 
metric of dollars.  However, EPA did employ a separate technique 
distinctive to formal cost-benefit analysis: it “discounted” the future life-
saving benefits of its rule by 3 percent per year from the year in which the 
benefits would accrue.  EPA thought that the regulatory benefits of its rule 
would accrue as soon as the risks from asbestos were reduced, and so it 
discounted these benefits from the (quite near-term) date on which 
exposures to asbestos would be reduced. 
 
 The court of appeals upheld EPA’s choice of a discount rate, but 
disagreed with EPA’s choice of a date from which to discount.  The court 
thought EPA should have discounted life-saving benefits from the time 
when a life-threatening illness would materialize, rather than from the time 
when exposures would be reduced.  947 F.2d at 1218.  For diseases with 
long latency periods, such as the cancers caused by asbestos and prevented 
by EPA’s rule, the court of appeals’ approach means discounting future 
benefits for years or, more likely, decades longer than EPA’s preferred 
approach would have required.  Discounting future benefits over many years 
greatly reduces their apparent magnitude.  To take one famous example, the 
deaths of 1 billion people 500 years from now, if discounted to “present 
value” at a rate of 5 percent, become equivalent to the death of less than one 
person today. 
 
 The court in Corrosion Proof Fittings held, moreover, that EPA had 
no choice but to discount future benefits.  Since EPA had chosen to discount 
the future monetary costs imposed by its rule, the court stated that the 
agency was required to discount the future benefits as well.  Citing only an 
article from The Economist magazine, the court reasoned that discounting 
benefits was required to maintain an “apples-to-apples” comparison between 
costs and benefits.  947 F.2d at 1218. 
 
 On the matter of discounting, too, the court of appeals’ opinion in 
Corrosion Proof Fittings is deeply problematic.  In an ordinary case, one 
would expect a court to defer to the agency’s determination that benefits 
accrued as soon as the risk from asbestos was reduced.  In everyday life, 
after all, we regard the removal of a risk as a benefit as soon as it happens; 
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we don’t ordinarily react to the removal of a carcinogen in our environment, 
for example, by announcing that we will hold off feeling relieved until the 
date when we might have developed cancer had the carcinogen not been 
taken away.   
 
 Moreover, nothing in TSCA requires the discounting of future non-
monetary benefits such as lives saved.  And, since under EPA’s mode of 
cost-benefit balancing, lives were not translated into dollars, EPA was 
already comparing apples and oranges by considering economic costs on the 
one hand and human lives on the other.  Nothing in TSCA forbids EPA to 
make such a comparison.  
 
 Indeed, a large and growing literature challenges the notion that one 
must compare monetary costs and human lives on common terms – such as 
dollars – in order to make coherent regulatory policy.  This literature argues, 
to put it simply, that to compare money and lives is necessarily to compare 
apples and oranges, no matter how elaborate the economic theory underlying 
the effort to transform lives into dollars.6  This literature also criticizes the 
technique of discounting itself, which renders future regulatory benefits 
trivial over any substantial discounting interval.7  
 
 The international agreements on POPs are aimed at phasing out 
pollutants that, among other things, cause long-latency human diseases such 
as cancer.  The agreements are also aimed at phasing out pollutants that 
persist in the environment over long periods of time and thus pose risks to 
future generations.  The benefits produced by the treaty are the very kinds of 
benefits trivialized through the use of discounting, as required by the court in 
Corrosion Proof Fittings.  TSCA, as currently interpreted, is thus not an 
effective mechanism for controlling these substances. 
   
 Limited Role for Unquantified Benefits 
 
 In seeking to ban virtually all uses of asbestos, EPA had justified its 
decision based partly on unquantified benefits.  For example, the agency 
used a 13-year time horizon in its analysis of costs and benefits, but 
emphasized that the benefits of the rule – though unquantified beyond the 
                                                 
6 See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (The New Press 2004). 
7 Id., ch. 8. 
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13-year horizon – would continue to occur even past its analytical horizon.  
54 Fed. Reg. at 29,486-88.  In addition, although the agency was able to 
quantify only the benefits of saving lives due to cancers averted, the agency 
also cited many other, unquantifiable benefits in support of its rule – 
including nonfatal illnesses, fatalities due to causes other than cancer, and 
ecological effects.  Id. at 29,479, 29,498. 
 
 The court in Corrosion Proof Fittings chastised EPA for relying too 
heavily on unquantified benefits.  The court stated, cryptically, that while 
EPA could use unquantified benefits to justify a rule in close cases, it could 
not use unquantified benefits to “effect a wholesale shift on the balance 
beam.”  947 F.2d at 1219.  
 
 The court’s ruling, again, is problematic.  Where some benefits are 
unquantifiable, how can one even determine whether the quantified part of 
the case for a rule is “close”?  Again, moreover, the court cites nothing in 
TSCA itself that requires the agency to give more respectful attention to 
quantified values than to unquantified ones.   
 
 And, once more, the court’s interpretation of TSCA makes this statute 
an especially weak tool in the context of persistent pollutants.  The benefits 
of reducing such pollutants are notoriously difficult to quantify.  In many 
cases, the one benefit that can be quantified with any precision – as in 
Corrosion Proof Fittings itself – is the prevention of death from cancer.  
Many other serious adverse effects – such as endocrine disruption, 
neurological impairment, immune system impairment, ecological damage, 
and so forth – are not amenable to precise quantification at this time, in most 
cases.  The court of appeals’ dismissal of the importance of unquantified 
benefits – except in the ill-defined “close cases” category – renders TSCA 
an ineffective means of addressing the harms of POPs. 
 
 How Much to Spend to Save a Human Life 
 
 One last aspect of the decision in Corrosion Proof Fittings that 
renders TSCA’s § 6 a weak mechanism for controlling toxic substances is 
the court’s holding that EPA had, with the asbestos ban, required industry to 
spend too much to save a human life.  The court pointed to cost figures per 
life saved, disaggregated by industry.  These figures showed how much it 
would cost to save a life in, for example, the asbestos pipes industry vs. the 
asbestos shingles industry vs. the asbestos brakes industry.  In some 
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industries, the cost per life saved, when lives were discounted at 3 percent 
per year, reached into the tens of millions of dollars.  947 F.2d at 1218, 
1222. 
 
 The court thought that EPA’s decision to require the asbestos industry 
to spend this much to save human lives meant that its review of the costs of 
the asbestos rule was deeply flawed: “The EPA's willingness to argue that 
spending $ 23.7 million to save less than one-third of a life reveals that its 
economic review of its regulations, as required by TSCA, was meaningless.”  
947 F.2d at 1223.  Thus the court overturned the rule on this ground as well. 
 
 Legal scholars have expressed alarm at the court’s aggressive review 
of EPA’s asbestos ban.8  One example of the court’s aggressiveness is, of 
course, the court’s intrusion into the agency’s basic policy choice of how 
much to spend to save a life. The court cited no statutory authority (other 
than the general injunction to consider costs) in coming to its decision, nor 
did it explain why disaggregating costs, industry by industry, was the only 
way to look at the cost imposed by the rule.  Notice, for example, that at an 
estimated expense of approximately $460 million, and a savings in lives of 
at least 202, the lives “cost” approximately $2.3 million apiece – not a bad 
bargain as these things go. In addition, recall that many of the benefits of the 
rule could not be quantified.  Or, to describe the asbestos rule another way, it 
would have cost approximately 14 cents for each person in the U.S.9 
Described in ways other than the one way chosen by the court of appeals, the 
asbestos rule seems like quite a reasonable expenditure for the amount of 
good it would have done. 
 
 TSCA Today 
 
 Despite the promise suggested by the text of TSCA section 6(a), that 
promise has remained unfulfilled in the years since Corrosion Proof Fittings 
was decided.  For here was a case in which the agency had spent a decade 
compiling a thorough and careful record of the harms caused by one of the 
hazardous substances about which we know the most, and yet the court 
overturned the agency’s rule and required the agency to conduct almost 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A 
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 525 (1997). 
9 See Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 449, 463-64 (1995) 
(reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION (Harvard 1993)). 
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impossibly detailed analysis before attempting to ban another substance 
under the statute.  Perhaps it goes without saying that the agency has not 
tried again. 
 
 TSCA’s transformation from potentially powerful tool against toxic 
substances into an ineffective law is well illustrated by the next action EPA 
proposed under section 6(a): a ban on lead fishing sinkers used by 
fishermen.  EPA, Lead Fishing Sinkers, 59 Fed. Reg. 11122 (Mar. 9, 1994). 
Even this rather small action – in comparison to the nationwide, staged ban 
on asbestos – never became final.  Likewise, EPA’s recent suggestion that it 
would use TSCA § 6 to ban the fuel additive MTBE, after MTBE had 
contaminated groundwater supplies all over the country, was dropped 
without ceremony by the Bush Administration. See Pete Yost, How the 
White House Shelved MTBE BAN, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 16, 2004. 
 
 The plain fact is that TSCA § 6 is not now a viable mechanism for 
meaningfully reducing the risks of toxic substances in this country.  This is 
why effective implementation of the international agreements on POPs is so 
important.  However, as I next discuss, current proposals for such 
implementation threaten to be even more paralyzing to the process of toxic 
substance control than the Corrosion Proof Fittings decision has been. 
 
II.  The Paralyzing Requirements of the “Discussion Draft” 
 
 If Congress wanted to ensure that no new harmful substances would 
ever be regulated by the U.S. under the international agreements on POPs, it 
could hardly do better than to pass the “Discussion Draft” bill now 
circulating in the House.  Merely duplicating the already-ineffective 
requirements of TSCA as prerequisites for regulating new POPs would be 
bad enough; the Discussion Draft goes even further and offers whole new 
obstacles to meaningful toxic substance control.  Better, in truth, to have no 
mechanism at all for adding new substances to the list – the route originally 
preferred by the current Administration10  – than to offer this charade in 
place of a meaningful listing process. 
 
 Before delving into the details of the Discussion Draft, it is worth 
bearing in mind the context in which EPA action under the POPs 
                                                 
10 Eric Pianin, White House Move on Toxic-Chemicals Pact Assailed, WASHINGTON 
POST, Apr. 12, 2002, at A13. 
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implementing legislation will occur.  The domestic listing process 
contemplated in the Discussion Draft begins only after international panels 
have engaged in a thorough, science-based process of review and have 
concluded that a new substance warrants regulation under the international 
agreements for POPs.11   
 
 This process includes scientific findings by the so-called Persistent 
Organic Pollutants Review Committee, a group of experts in risk analysis 
designated by parties to the POPs treaty and chosen for their expertise and 
with equitable geographical distribution in mind.  Stockholm Convention art. 
19(6)(a).  The Committee reviews chemicals for possible inclusion on the 
POPs list through evaluation of the chemicals in light of several screening 
criteria.  Id., art. 8(3). If the Conference of the Parties decides that a 
chemical is a good candidate for listing, then the Committee goes back to 
work and conducts a detailed risk profile of the chemical in question.  If, 
based on this analysis, the Committee determines that a chemical “is likely, 
as a result of its long-range environmental transport, to lead to significant 
adverse human health and/or environmental effects such that global action is 
warranted,” id., art. 8(7)(a), then the matter returns to the Conference of the 
Parties, which decides whether to list the chemical based on an assessment 
of the scientific evidence and analysis of possible control measures for the 
chemical.  Id., Annex F. 
 
 The POPs treaty explicitly takes a protective, precautionary approach 
to regulating POPs.  The preamble states:  “Mindful of the precautionary 
approach as set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, the objective of this Convention is to protect human 
health and the environment from persistent organic pollutants.” Stockholm 
Convention, art. 1.  Article 8(7)(a) of the Convention specifically states that 
“[l]ack of full scientific certainty shall not prevent the proposal [to list a new 
chemical] from proceeding,” and Article 8(9) provides that the Conference 
of the Parties, “taking due account of the recommendations of the 
Committee, including any scientific uncertainty, shall decide, in a 
precautionary manner, whether to list the chemical.”  In the fierce current 
                                                 
11 For a concise and helpful discussion of the background and requirements of the POPs 
treaty, see Joel A. Mintz, Two Cheers for POPs: A Summary and Assessment of the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 14 Geo. Int’l Envtl. L. Rev. 319 
(2001). 
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debates over precautionary approaches to environmental policy, therefore, 
the POPs treaty comes down firmly on the side of precaution.12
 
 Despite the thorough, science-based review preceding the 
international listing process, the Discussion Draft would require EPA 
essentially to start all over again, if it acts at all in response to the 
international recommendations.  The problems with the Discussion Draft’s 
approach to listing new POPs include the following: excessive discretion on 
the part of EPA; duplication of scientific effort; unnecessary and 
problematic injunctions to the agency to use “sound science”; and biased and 
paralyzing directives to undertake cost-benefit balancing and to give 
economic costs particularly close attention.  I discuss each of these problems 
in turn. 
 
 EPA discretion 
 
 The Discussion Draft does not require EPA to act at all in response to 
international recommendations on listing new POPs.  Instead, it simply 
states that EPA “may” regulate in response to such recommendations.  
§502(e)(1)(A).  In addition, after international bodies have undertaken 
painstaking review of the harms caused by substances that are candidates for 
regulation, EPA has discretion whether even to consider those bodies’ 
recommendations; here, too, the permissive “may” is used in the Discussion 
Draft.  § 502(e)(3).  So little, apparently, do the Discussion Draft’s authors 
think of the international scientific review process, that the findings from 
this process are labeled merely “additional considerations” in the Draft.  Id. 
 
 Moreover, even if EPA does act in response to the international 
recommendations, there is no deadline in the Discussion Draft for a 
conclusion to be reached and a regulation to issue.  Finally, if EPA does not 
act, there is no “action-forcing” mechanism, such as the citizen petition 
process contained in TSCA § 21, which would bring pressure to bear on 
EPA for its failure to act. 
 
                                                 
12 See generally Pep Fuller & Thomas O. McGarity, Beyond the Dirty Dozen: The Bush 
Administration’s Cautious Approach to Listing New Persistent Organic Pollutants and 
the Future of the POPs Convention, 28 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol. Rev. 1 (2003). 
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 The Discussion Draft, in short, leaves the decision whether to do 
anything in response to international recommendations on regulation of new 
substances completely up to EPA.   
 
 Duplication of scientific effort 
 
 As discussed, the international scientific review committee on POPs 
will conduct a detailed analysis of the scientific case for adding a new 
chemical to the list under the POPs treaty.  Remarkably, however, the 
Discussion Draft not only, as noted above, gives EPA discretion in deciding 
whether even to consider the international recommendations on new POPs 
listings, it also directs EPA to conduct entirely new scientific analyses of 
candidate chemicals.  EPA is, according to the Discussion Draft, required to 
consider a scientific assessment of the effects of candidate chemicals on 
health and the environment, and to consider the magnitude of exposures of 
these chemicals experienced by humans and the environment. §502(e)(2)(A-
B).  It is unclear what is expected to be gained by this duplicative scientific 
review.  Compounding the problem is, as I discuss next, the Discussion 
Draft’s cryptic and troubling invocations of “sound science.” 
 
 “Sound science” 
 
 The Discussion Draft provides: 
 
In assessing risks and effects, the Administrator shall use sound and 
objective scientific practices, and shall determine the weight of the 
scientific evidence concerning such risks or effects based on the best 
available scientific information, including peer-reviewed studies, in 
the rulemaking record. 
 
§ 502(e)(4).   
 
 It is hard to know quite what to make of this provision.  On the one 
hand, it is not unusual for federal laws regulating risks to direct the relevant 
agencies to use the “best available evidence” in coming to their decisions.  
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (regarding health standards under 
Occupational Safety and Health Act).  Viewed in that light, the provision is a 
rather benign reminder to EPA to use good science in deciding whether to 
regulate additional POPs – a reminder that merely duplicates the 
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Administrative Procedure Act’s injunction against arbitrary and capricious 
agency decision making. 
 
 On the other hand, “sound … scientific practices,” or “sound science,” 
has, in conservative circles, become a buzzword for skepticism about 
findings of risk to humans and the environment due to chemicals, products, 
industrial pollution, etc.  The movement for “sound science,” in fact, began 
with the tobacco industry’s efforts to counter scientific evidence of the 
harms of their products.  Thus the presence in this bill of references to the 
ill-begotten “sound science” theme raises the troubling possibility that this 
provision will be used not merely to duplicate the APA’s salutary injunction 
against arbitrary and capricious agency decisions, but instead will be used 
somehow to block important scientific information from being considered in 
the process of deciding whether to regulate additional POPs. 
 
 The Discussion Draft’s reference to “peer-reviewed studies” raises 
similar possibilities.  On the one hand, the bill does not limit EPA’s 
consideration only to peer-reviewed studies, and thus the bill may be taken 
to mean simply that EPA should include peer-reviewed studies, where 
possible, in its scientific examinations – something the agency does 
routinely in any event.  On the other hand, “peer review,” like “sound 
science,” has become a kind of rallying cry for industry and regulatory 
skeptics within the Administration, and sometimes has come to mean review 
by “peers” within industry is favored over review by other scientific experts. 
Here, too, therefore, the meaning of the provision on science is unclear, but 
portents of mischief abound. 
 
 Cost-benefit analysis 
 
 The Discussion Draft would weigh down the process for listing new 
POPs with stultifying, time-consuming, resource-intensive, and 
systematically biased analytical requirements.  I discuss these requirements 
below.  But first, it is important to note that nothing in the Discussion Draft 
requires EPA even to publish the results of its detailed analysis.  Whereas 
TSCA itself explicitly states the EPA must “consider and publish a statement 
with respect to” costs, benefits, and potential substitute substances, 15 
U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1), the Discussion Draft merely requires EPA to 
“consider” the listed factors.  § 502(e)(2).  The contrast between TSCA and 
the Discussion Draft is striking particularly because the language regarding 
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publishing a statement comes from the part of TSCA that is otherwise 
quoted quite closely in the Discussion Draft.   
 
 If EPA decided not to regulate a POP newly listed pursuant to the 
POPs treaty, therefore, there is no guarantee that EPA would even be forced 
to explain why it decided not to do so.  This is especially so since the 
Discussion Draft provides no process for citizen petitions calling upon the 
agency to act when it has failed to act.  If EPA decided to regulate a newly 
listed POPs, however, it would of course have to explain its decision under 
the APA.  Thus the Discussion Draft in this way, too, contains an internal 
bias against listing new POPs. 
 
 The problems go deeper still.  The Discussion Draft allows EPA to 
regulate a newly listed POP only “to the extent necessary to protect human 
health and the environment that achieves a reasonable balance of social, 
environmental, and economic costs and benefits.”  § 502(e)(1)(A).  The 
Draft affords no clue, however, as to how a “reasonable balance” is to be 
identified.  Although the Draft does provide a laundry list of factors EPA is 
to consider in coming to a decision, § 502(e)(2)(A-E), it does not give EPA 
guidance as to how to figure out what a “reasonable balance” of costs and 
benefits is.  Here, too, therefore, the Discussion Draft affords EPA a huge 
amount of discretion in making decisions on newly listed POPs.  Moreover, 
given the precedent of Corrosion Proof Fittings, one must worry about the 
courts’ ultimate role in policing exactly which regulatory measures afford a 
“reasonable balance” between costs and benefits and which do not. 
 
 Quite apart from the large amount of discretion afforded by the ill-
defined “reasonable balance” standard is the internal bias against regulation 
embedded in that standard.  Cost-benefit balancing is notoriously, and 
systematically, biased against environmental regulation.  It is particularly 
skewed against environmental regulation that targets pollutants like the 
POPs – pollutants with large but insidious and sometimes subtle effects, 
spread over a vast population (in this case, the whole world) and reaching 
into the distant future.13   
 
                                                 
13 See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Future, 87 Geo. 
L.J. 2025 (1999). 
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 Here are some of the basic features of cost-benefit balancing that 
systematically bias it against environmental protection, particularly 
protection against pollutants like POPs:14
 
• Many of the benefits of reducing these pollutants cannot be 
quantified.  In many cases, avoiding cancer is the only benefit that can 
be quantified.  This leaves all other causes of death, plus all nonfatal 
illnesses avoided and all ecological effects, left out of the numerical 
tally of costs and benefits.  When a benefit is not quantified, its worth 
is typically treated as if it were zero in a cost-benefit balancing. 
 
• The costs of regulating environmental risks are often overstated, and 
often by a large amount.15 
 
• Even when benefits can be quantified, the process of fitting values 
like human lives and health into a cost-benefit balance is fraught with 
difficulty.  Sometimes, monetary values are attached to benefits such 
as human lives.  These values are generally based on the amount of 
extra income male workers in the 1970s were willing to accept in 
exchange for increased workplace risks.  The monetary values arising 
from this context not only tell us little about these workers’ own 
values (there is no evidence they actually knew the precise risks they 
faced, or could afford to turn down a risky job even if they did know), 
but tell us even less about the monetary values one might attached to 
risks of cancer, risks that are involuntarily imposed, risks to future 
generations, and so forth.  They tell us little, in other words, about the 
value of controlling the risks of POPs. 
 
• The technique of discounting – required by the court in Corrosion 
Proof Fittings despite the absence of a statutory mandate for it – 
belittles desires to protect this and future generations against long-
term and persistent risks.  Discounting would easily trivialize the 
benefits of regulating POPs.  Yet protection of the future – for our 
own generation, our children’s generation, and generations yet to 
                                                 
14 These arguments are elaborated in FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, 
PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (The 
New Press 2004). 
15 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity and Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, 
Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 Texas L. Rev. 1197 (2002). 
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come – is one of the basic principles animating a document like the 
POPs treaty.  Discounting, through an arcane and seemingly technical 
process, silently undermines this animating principle.16 
 
• Cost-benefit balancing typically relies on a starkly impoverished view 
of what matters when it comes to risk.  Frequently, cost-benefit 
analysis looks solely at the probability and magnitude of harm, in 
numerical terms, rather than also at the cultural and moral context in 
which that harm might be inflicted.  Thus cost-benefit analysis most 
often ignores the kinds of considerations – an aversion to involuntary 
and uncontrollable risks, a preference for an equitable distribution of 
risk, a desire to avoid consequences that threaten whole communities 
– that most people take into account in judging risk. 
 
These are, in brief, some of the most fundamental reasons why cost-benefit 
balancing is a bad idea in the context of environmental protection.  Its use in 
the POPs implementing legislation would virtually ensure that no new POPs 
will be regulated in this country pursuant to the international agreements on 
POPs.  If this is what the authors of the Discussion Draft desire, they should 
say so directly, and not hide behind the seemingly objective face of cost-
benefit balancing. 
 
 Even if cost-benefit balancing were not systematically biased against 
regulation of POPs, the analytical requirements imposed by the Discussion 
Draft would nevertheless paralyze any effort to regulate POPs.  The 
Discussion Draft goes beyond TSCA § 6 – which, you will recall, has been 
buried under the onerous analytical requirements ladled into it by the court 
in Corrosion Proof Fittings – and adds even more factors for EPA to 
consider in deciding whether to regulate POPs.  In addition to all of the 
factors listed in TSCA’s § 6, the Discussion Draft would also require EPA to 
consider the risks and economic consequences of, plus a laundry list of other 
factors relating to, substitutes for chemical substances.  § 502(e)(2)(C).  In 
addition, the Draft would require EPA to consider not only the costs, 
benefits, effects on the national economy, etc., of a regulatory decision, but 
also “the degree to which the manufacture, processing, distribution in 
commerce for export, use, or disposal of the chemical substance or mixture 
is necessary to prevent significant harm to an important sector of the 
                                                 
16 For more detailed discussion, see Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 Land 
& Water L. Rev. 39 (1999). 
 18
economy. § 502(e)(2)(D).  In other words, even if the cost-benefit profile 
tilted in the direction of regulation, EPA must nevertheless go on to consider 
whether an industry would be too hard-hit by a regulation to proceed.  
Finally, EPA must, according to the Discussion Draft, also consider not only 
the national, but also the international, consequences of a regulatory action.  
§ 502(e)(2)(E). 
 
 This is a research agenda and analytical program to fill several 
lifetimes.  Even under the relatively “streamlined,” pre-Corrosion Proof 
Fittings version of TSCA, it took EPA ten years and 45,000 pages to justify 
its asbestos ban.  And even then the court overturned the rule for lack of 
sufficient analysis.  The Discussion Draft dumps even more analytical 
requirements on EPA, with the likely result that no rule would ever see the 
light of day under this framework. 
 
III.  The Administration’s Constitutional Arguments Regarding 
Implementation of the POPs Conventions Are Without Merit 
 
 The Bush Administration has recently voiced two different kinds of 
arguments implicating Congress’s authority to enact legislation 
implementing the international agreements on POPs.  Both arguments are 
without merit. 
 
 First, the Department of Justice has argued, in a letter to Senator Tom 
Harkin dated March 25, 2004, that mandatory notice-and-comment 
procedures in POPs implementing legislation (there, the Department was 
discussing amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)), would “raise constitutional concerns.”  Letter 
from William Moschella, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative 
Affairs, to The Honorable Tom Harkin (March 25, 2004).  It appears that the 
Department was under the impression that merely seeking out the views of 
the public, while international proceedings on whether to add pollutants to 
the list of POPs were ongoing, would interfere with the Executive’s treaty-
making powers.  The letter is exceedingly thin on legal authority, and even 
thinner on common sense: it provides no sensible reason to think that merely 
requiring notice and an opportunity for comment, without any obligation to 
change one’s international negotiating position, interferes with the 
Executive’s prerogatives.  The letter is of a piece with the Administration’s 
other recent, extravagant claims of Executive prerogatives, offered in 
contexts ranging from its refusal to make public information concerning 
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Vice-President Cheney’s Energy Task Force, to its arguments concerning 
the treatment of detainees in Cuba, to its alarming claims, in memoranda on 
the treatment of prisoners in the ongoing “war on terror,” regarding the 
Executive’s immunity from the requirements of the Geneva Convention.  A 
detailed and persuasive refutation of the Department’s analysis is attached to 
CIEL senior attorney Glenn Wiser’s written testimony for today’s hearing.  
Although the Discussion Draft does indeed provide an opportunity for public 
notice and comment, the rebuttal to the Department of Justice’s 
constitutional arguments is important to keep in mind if future implementing 
bills do not require notice and comment early in the international process. 
 
 A second constitutional argument that has attended discussions of 
POPs implementing legislation has to do with what is sometimes known as 
the “international nondelegation doctrine.”  The idea is that if Congress 
obligates the Executive branch to act in response to the decision of an 
international body, that is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
authority.   
 
 To understand this claim, it is helpful to understand the exact context 
in which it might arise.  Under the POPs treaty, new POPs may be added 
only by consensus of the parties or, failing consensus, by a three-quarters 
majority of the parties.  Stockholm Convention, arts. 22(4), 21(1-3).  Parties 
may, in individual cases, decide not to accept a new POPs listing.  Id., arts. 
22(3)(b), 22(4).  Or, in the alternative, parties may, at the time of ratifying 
the treaty itself, select the “opt-in” alternative, which means that they will 
not be bound by any new pollutant listing unless they affirmatively indicate 
their intention to be bound.  Id., art. 25(4). 
 
 Thus, with respect to deciding whether to accept new pollutant listings 
under the POPs treaty, the U.S. has three options: (1) it can accept a decision 
of the Conference of the Parties to regulate a new pollutant; (2) it can, on a 
case-by-case basis, decide not to accept the new listing; or (3) it can, in 
ratifying the treaty, elect the opt-in provision, thus requiring affirmative 
action to regulate a new pollutant in every case of a new listing. 
 
 If the Executive chooses not to take the last route – that is, it does not 
select the opt-in option – then there would seem to no meritorious 
constitutional complaint about being bound by international decisions on 
new POPs.  The Executive’s assent to such decisions would be embedded in 
the original treaty itself.  Likewise, if Congress embodied this assent in 
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implementing legislation which required EPA to take action to control newly 
listed chemicals, there would be no constitutional problem.  Indeed, many 
laws implementing international obligations take this general form.  The 
Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances, for example, provides that 
the original standards of the Protocol may be strengthened by a majority 
vote of the parties, and that vote is binding on the parties.  The Clean Air 
Act implements this agreement by requiring EPA to take the actions required 
by the stricter standards.  42 U.S.C. § 7671e(a)(3).  Similarly, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (“CITES”) provides for international decisions adding endangered 
species to the list of protected species, and the Endangered Species Act 
prohibits trade in internationally listed species.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(c).  Other 
examples may be found in the memorandum attached to Glenn Wiser’s 
written testimony for this hearing. 
 
 I am aware of no case law disputing the proposition that agencies may 
be obligated to act in response to decisions of international bodies where a 
treaty and statute require them to do so.  Indeed, the case law I am aware of 
supports this proposition.  In George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 
(D.C. Cir. 1998), the D.C. Circuit held that EPA was, in setting new rules for 
reformulated gasoline, justified in taking into account a WTO ruling against 
EPA’s previous rule.  Although the Clean Air Act did not specifically give 
EPA the authority to take this ruling into account in establishing its rule, the 
court expressed a desire to avoid any confrontation with U.S. treaty 
obligations, and upheld EPA’s consideration of the WTO ruling.  The case 
would have been even easier for EPA had the statute explicitly allowed 
consideration of the international body’s decision in setting domestic 
regulatory policy. 
 
 Thus, it appears that the U.S. could, without any constitutional 
problem, choose the “opt-out” option of the POPs treaty, meaning that it 
would be required to regulate any newly listed pollutants unless it 
affirmatively indicated its desire not to accept the listing of such pollutants. 
 
 The other context in which the constitutional arguments that have 
floated about these issues might arise is if the U.S. selected the “opt-in” 
option under the POPs treaty.  In that case, an affirmative act by the U.S. 
would be required for any new POPs to be regulated here.  This is the 
situation in which we find ourselves today, as the Administration has 
indicated that this is the option it will choose when the treaty is ratified. 
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 In this situation, the question becomes whether Congress could, in the 
legislation implementing the POPs treaty, require EPA to act in response to 
a new listing decision by the Conference of the Parties.  Suppose, for 
example, that the legislation simply required EPA to make a decision as to 
whether to regulate a newly listed POP.  The international decision to list the 
POP would be the trigger for requiring EPA to come to a decision about 
whether to regulate the new POP.  This kind of regime would pose no 
constitutional problem.  Congress often requires agencies to act when certain 
conditions are met.  Indeed, the more precise the conditions that trigger 
agency action, the less Congress’s actions even come close to running afoul 
of the constitutional prohibition reflected in the nondelegation doctrine 
(which, it must be noted, has not been found by the Supreme Court to have 
been violated in almost 70 years).  Whether the trigger for agency 
consideration of a problem is an agency factual finding, a state decision, or 
an international decision, the conclusion remains the same: Congress is 
entitled to require agency action based on satisfaction of a condition 
precedent identified by Congress. 
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